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KULCHAR~KULCHAR
Cite as 462 P.2d 17

containing contraband, and thus warranted
placing petitioner under arrest.
The circumstantial prima facie case presented by the prosecution suggests no reason j usti fying denial of an opportunity for
petitioner to explain at trial, if he chooses
to do so, how his airplane ticket came to be
in a bag containing marijuana. The superior court denied the motion to suppress
evidence, and the Court of Appeal denied
an extraordinary writ. Issuance by this
court of a peremptory writ directing the
superior court to suppress the paper bag and
its marijuana contents is unjustified.
McCOMB and BURKE,

JJ.,

concur.

Rehearing denied; McCOMB, MOSK
md BURKE, JJ., dissenting.
o
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82 CaI.Rptr. 489
Betty Rlchwhlle KULCHAR, Plalnllff
and Appellant,
Y.

George Victor KULCHAR, Defendant
and Respondent.

S. F.22695.
Supreme

Court of California,
In 'Bank.

Dec. 23, 1969.

Divorced husband sought modifica':'
tion of interlocutory decree of ,divorce to
relieve him of liability to pay federal income taxes assessed against parties on
income accruing to wife in New Zealand.
The Superior Court, San Mateo County,
Wayne R. Millington, J., entered judgment for husband and wife appealed. The
Supreme Court, Traynor, C. J., held that
where both husband ,and wife knew of
New Zealand assets but husband and his
attorney chose not to investigate their taxability ,although property settlement agreement expressly required husband to hold
wife harmless as to any monies due any
taxing agency, husband was not entitled
to have tax provision struck from the de462 P.2d-2
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cree on basis of mutual mistake when he
subsequently received assessment for federal taxes on theretofore undisclosed income accumulated during marriage by New

Zealand corporation in wife's name.
Reversed.

McComb, J., dissented.
Opinion, Cal.App., 78 Cal.Rptr. 823,
vacated.
I. Judgment e=>403

Under certain circumstances, court
sitting in equity can set aside or modify
a valid final judgment.
2. Judgment €=I03

Power of court sitting in equity to
set aside or modify valid final judgment can
only be exercised when circumstances of
case are sufficient to overcome strong
public policy favoring finality of judgments.
3. Divorce <€=255

Interlocutory divorce decrees are res
judicata as to all questions determined
therein, including property rights of parties.
4. Divorce €=>255
If property settlement is incorporated
'divorce decree, settlement is merged
with decree and becomes final judicial detern:tination of property rights of parties.

in

5. Divorce ¢;;>246, 254

Rules governing extrinsic fraud and
mistake apply to alimony awards and property settlements incorporated in divorce
decrees.
6. Judgment €=I43(I)

"Extrinsic fraud" as basis for setting' aside former judgment or decree
arises when party is denied fair 'adversary
hearing because he has been deliberately
kept from knowing of the action or has
been fraudulently prevented from presenting his claim or defense.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
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7. Judgment e=>435, 443(1)

Judgment will not be set aside on
basis of extrinsic fraud or extrinsic mistake if party has been given notice of action, has not been prevented from participating therein and has had opportunity to
present his case to court to protect himself
from mistake or any fraud attempted by
his adversary.

hold wife harmless as to any monies due
any taxing agency, husband was not en~
titled to have tax provision struck from
decree on basis of mutual mistake when
he subSequeritly received assessment for
federal taxes on theretofore undisclosed in~
come accumulated during marriage by New
Zealand corporation in wife's name.

8. Judgment 08=>435

Mutual mistake is not sufficient to
set aside a final judgment.
9. Judgment 08=>540

Principles of res judicata demand

that parties present their entire case in
one proceeding.
10. Judgment _ 5 , 443(1)

Relief from judgment on ground of
extrinsic fraud or extrinsic mistake will
be denied when complaining party has
contributed to the fraud or mistake giving
rise' to the judgment.
II. Judgment 08=>435, 443(1)

Whether case involves intrinsic or ·extrinsic fraud or mistake is not determined
abstractly and it is necessary to examine
facts in light of policy that party who
failed to assemble all his evidence at trial
should not be privileged to relitigate case
as well as policy permitting party to seek
relief from judgment entered in a proceeding in which he has been deprived of
fair opportunity fully to present his case.
12. Husband and Wife *"278(1)

Duty of one spouse to fully disclose
to other spouse the assets to be divided up~
on separation arises out of fiduciary relationship between the husband and wife.
13. Divorce 08=>254

Where both husband and wife knew
of New Zealand assets but husband and
his attorney chose not to investigate their
taxability, although property settlement
agreement expressly required husband to
I. There was, no formal property settlement
agreement. All provisions of the decree
relating to the distribution of property

James Martin MacInnis, for plaintiff
and appellant.
Goth, Dennis & Aaron and James M.
Dennis, Redwood City, for defendant and
respondent.
. TRAYNOR, Chief Justice.
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the
Superior Court of San Mateo County modifying an int~rlocutory decree of divorce
to relieve defendant of liability to pay
federal income taxes assessed against the
parties on income accruing to plaintiff in
New Zealand.
Plaintiff secured an interlocutory decree
of divorce from defendant on July 3, 1964.
The decree included the disposition of the
community and separate property of the
parties.1 The decree provided, in part:
"Oefendant shall indemnify and hold
plaintiff free and harmless in the matter of
any monies due any taxing agency, whether Federal, State or County, for the calendar years prior to 1964."
In 1966, following the divorce proceedings defendant received a tax assessment
of approximately $22,000 for federal income' taxes based on theretofore undisclosed' income accumulated during the mar~
riagoe by a New Zealand corporation in
plaintiff's name. Defendant moved to mod~
ify the divorce decree to relieve him of any
liability for taxes on the New Zealand in~
come ;on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
extririsic mistake., After a hearing on de~
fendant's motion, the trial court concluded
that the tax provision in the decree "was
were submitted to the court on the stipulation of the parties.

EULOHAR. v.EULOHAR.
Cite as 462 P.2d 17

included and approved by the parties as a
result of the mutual mistake of the. parties
and further, that there was no intent of the
parties that defendant should pay United
States Federal income tax resulting from
income to plaintiff in New Zealand." The
court struck the tax provision from the
decree "because of the mutual mistake of
the parties."

[1,2] Under certain drcumstaJ'l,ces a
court, sitting in equity; can set aside or
modify a valid final judgment. (Olivera v.
Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 575-576, 122
P.2d 564, 140 A.L.R. 1328; Caldwell v.
Taylor (1933) 218 Cal. 471, 475, 23P.2d
.758, 88 A.L.R. 1194.) This power, however, can only be exercised when the circumstances of the case are sufficient to
overcome the strong policy favoring the
finality of judgments. "A basic requirement of an action which can lead to a valid
judgment is that a procedure 'should be
adopted which in the normal case will give
to the parties- an opportunity for a fair
trial which is reasonable in view of the
requirements of public policy in the
particular 'type of case. If this requirement is met, a judgment awarded in an
action is not void merely because the
particular" individual against whom it was
rendered did not in fact -have an opportunity
to present his claim or defense before an
impartial tribunal. • •.• [Plublic policy
requires that only in -exceptional circumstances should the consequences of res
judicata be denied to a valid judgu,ent."
(Rest., Judgments, § 118, c~m. a.)
[3-5] Interlocutory divorce decree are
res judicata as to all questions determined
therein, including the property rights of the
parties. (In re Williams' Estate (1950) 36
Ca1.2d 289, 292, 223 P.2d 248, 22 A.L.R.2d
716; Adamson v. Adamson (1962) 209 Cal.
App.2d 492, SOl, 26 Cal.Rptr. 236.) If a
property settlement is incorporated in the
divorce decree, the settlement is merged
with the decree and becomes_ the final
judicial determination of ,the property
rights of the parties. (Broome v. Broome
(1951) 104 Cal:App.2d 148, 154-155,231 P.
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2d 171.)
Thus, the rules governing
extrinsic fraud and mistake apply to
alimony' awards and property -settlements
incorporated in divorce decrees. (Jorgensen
v. Jotgensen (1948) 32 Cal.2d 13, 18-23,
193 P.2d 728; Cameron v. Cameron (1948)
88 Cal.App.2d 585, 595-597, 199 P.2d 443;
Hosner v. Skelly (1946} 72 Cal.App.2d 457,
461, 164 P.2d 573; Horton v. Horton
(1941) 18 Cal.2d 579, 584-585, 116 P.2d 605;
Hendricks v. Hendricks (1932) 216 Cal. 321,
323-324, 14 P.2d 83; Godfrey v. Godfrey
(1939) 30 Cal.App.2d 370, 378-380, 86 P.2d
357; Smith v. Smith (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d
154, 161,-164,270 P.2d 613.)
[6] Extrinsic fraud usually arises when
a party "is denied a f~ir adversary hearing
because he has been Hdeliberately kept in
ignorance of the" action or proceeding, or
in some other way fraudulently prevented
from presenting _his claim or defense." (3
Witkin, Cal. Procedure, p. 2124.) "Where
the unsuccessful party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent,
as by keeping him away from court, a false
promise of a - corp.promise; or where the
defendant never had knowledge of the suit,
being kept in ignorance by the acts of the
plaintiff; or where an 'attorney fraudulently or' without authority assumes to
represent a party and connives at his
defeat; or where the attorney regularly
employed corruptly sells out his client's
interest to' the other side,-these, and
similar cases which ·show that there has
never been a real contest in the trial or
hearing of the case, are reasons for which
a new suit may be sustained to set aside
and annul the former judgment or decree,
and open the case for a new and a fait
hearing." (United States v. Throckmorton
(1878) 98 U.S. 61, 65-66, 25 L.Ed. 93.)
The right to' relief has also been extended
to" cases involving extnnslC mistake.
(Bacon v. Bacon (1907) 150 Cal. 477, 491492, 89 P. 317; Olivera v. Grace, supra, 19
Cal.2d at p. 577, 122 P.2d 564.) "In some
cases * * * the ground of relief is not
so much the fraud or other misconduct of
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the defendant as it is the excusable neglect
of the plaintiff to appear and present his
claim or defense. If such neglect results
in an unjust judgment, without a fair
adversary hea,.ing~ the basis for equitable
relief is present, and is often -called
'extrinsic mistake.'" (3 Witkin, Ca1.Proce-

dure, p. 2128.)
Extrinsic mistake is found when a party
becomes incompetent but no guardian ad
litem is appointed (Olivera v. Grace, supra,

19 Cal.2d at p. 577, 122 P.2d 564; Dei Tos
v. Dei Tos (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 81, 8485, 232 P.2d 873; Winslow v. McCarthy
(1918) 39 Ca1.App. 337, 340, 178 P. 720);
when one party relies on another to defend
(Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Ca1.2d 849,
855-856, 48 Ca1.Rptr. 620, 409 P.2d 700;
Roussey v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. (1967)
251 Cal.App.2d 251, 256, 59 Ca1.Rptr. 399);
when there is reliance on an attorney who

becomes incapacitated to act (Jeffords v.
Young (1929) 98 Cal.App. 400, 405-406,
277 P. 163; Smith v. Busniewski (1952)
115 Cal.App.2d 124, 127-128, 251 P.2d 697;
Antonsen v. Pacific Container Co. (1941)
48 CaI.App.2d 535, 538, 120 P.2d 148);
when a mistake led a court to do what it

never intended· (Sullivan v. Lumsden
(1897) 118 Cal. 664,669, SO P. 777; Bacon
v. Bacon, supra, 150 Cal. at pp. 492-493, 89
P. 317); when a mistaken belief of one

in not properly filing an answer (Hallett v.
Slaughter (1943) 22 Cal.2d 552, 556-557, 140
P.2d 3; Turner v. Allen (1961) 189 Cal.
App.2d 753, 757-760, 11 Cal.Rptr. 630); and
mistaken belief as to immunity from suit

(Bartell v. Johnson (1943) 60 CaI.App.2d
432, 436-437, 140 P.2d 878).. [7-9]

Relief is denied, however, if a

party has been given notice of an action
and has not been prevented from partici-

pating therein. He has had an opportunity
to

pres~nt

his case to the court and to pro-

tect himself from mistake or from any
fraud attempted by his adversary. (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra, 32 Cal.2d 13
at p. 18, 193 P.2d 728; Westphal v. West-.
phal (1942) 20 Ca1.2d 393, 397, 126 P.2d
105; Gale v. Witt (1948) 31 Cal.2d 362,
367, .188 P.2d 755.) Moreover, a mutual
mistake that might be sufficient to set
aside a contract is not sufficient to set

aside .. final judgment. The principles of
res judicata demand that the parties present their entire case in one proceeding.
"Public policy requires that pressure be

brought upon litigants to use great care
in preparing cases for trial and in ascer-

taining all the facts. A rule which would
permit the re-opening of cases previously
decided because of error or ignorance

during the progress of the trial would in
a large measure vitiate the effects of the

party prevented proper notice of the action

rules of res judicata." (Rest., Judgments,
§ 126, com. a.) Courts deny relief, therefore, when the fraud or mistake is "intrinsic" ; that is, when it "goes to the
merits of the prior proceedings, which
at the time the judgment was entered should have been guarded against by the
(Watson v. Watson (1958) 161 CaI.App.2d plaintiff at that time'" (Comment, Equi35, 39-40, 235 P.2dlO11; Saunders v. table Relief From Judgments, Orders and
Saunders (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 67, 72-73, Decrees Obtained by Fraud (1934) 23 Cal.
320 P.2d 131; Evry v. Tremble (1957) 154 L.Rev. 79, 83-84; see Pico v. Cohn (1891)
Cal.App.2d 444, 447-449, 316 P.2d 49). 91 Cal. 129, 134, 25 P. 970, 27 P. 537, 13
Relief has also been extended to cases' L.R.A. . 3j6; Hendricks v. Hendricks,
involving negligence of a party's attorney supra, 216 Cal. at pp. 323-324, 14 P.2d 83.)

(Aldabe v. Aldabe (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d
453, 475, 26 Ca1.Rptr. 208; Boyle v. Boyle
(1929) 97 CaI.App. 703, 706, 276 P. 118);
or when the complaining party was disabled

2. The decisions in both Hallett and BMtell have been criticized.
(See Comment (1943) 31 Cal.L.Rev. 600.) "The
cases on intrinsic fraud, involving perjury, false documents and other reprehensible conduct by the adverse party,
are far more compelling, yet relief is

uniformly denied for good reason.
• • • The Hallett and Bartell caSes
involved no true extrinsic factors in the
accepted sense, and they raise serious
questions as to the practical finality of
any default judgment." (3 Witkin, Cal.
Procedure, p. 2130.)

JroLOllAR v. JroLOlIAR
Cite a8 f62 P.2d 17

[10] Relief is also denied when the
complaining party has contributed to the
fraud or mistake -giving rise to the judgment thus obtained. (Hammell' v. Britton
(1941) 19 Cal.2d 72, SO, 119 P.2d 333;
Rudy v. Siotwinsky (1925) 73 Cal.App.
459, 465, 238 P. 783; Rest., Judgments, §
129.) "If the complainant was guilty of
negligence in permitting the fraud to be
practiced on the mistake to occur equity
will deny relief." Wilson v. :Wilson
(1942) 55 CalApp2d 421, 427, 130 P 2d
782, 785.)
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when preparing income tax returns, an
attorney, who later represented defendant
in the divorce action, made some inquiry
into the nature of the New Zealand income
at the request of defendant. The attorney
abandoned further investigation after
plaintiff stated that a law firm known to
defendant's attorney had advised her that
the New Zealand income was not taxable.
The attorney knew that the New Zealand
holdings were "sizable." Both parties
testified that the tax provision was included
in the decree because of an audit being
conducted by the Internal Revenue Service
with respect to an unrelated transaction by
defendant.

[11] Whether the case involves .intrinsic or extrinsic fraud or mistake is
not determined abstractly. "It is neces[12] Clearly. the present case does not
sary to examine 'the facts in the light of
the policy that a party who failed to as- involve the failure of one spouse to dissemble all his evidence at the trial should close· fully the assets to be divided upon
not be privileged to relitigate a case, as separation. (See Taylor v. Taylor (1923)
well as the policy permitting a party to 192 Cal. 71, 218 P. 756, 51 A.L.R. 1074;
seek relief from a judgment entered in a Milekovich v. Quinn (1919) 40 Cal.App.
proceeding in which he was deprived of a 537, 181 P. 256.) The duty to disclose
fair opportunity fully to present his case." arises out of the fiduciary relationship
(Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra,' 32 Cal.2d between the husband and wife. (Vai v.
Bank of America (1961) 56 Cal.2d 329,
13 at p. 19, 193 P.2d 728, at p. 732.)
The evidence in the present case es- 337-340, 15 Cal.Rptr. 71, 364 P.2d 247;
tablishes that it is a case in which a party Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra, 32 Ca1.2d
"failed to assemble all his evidence at the 13 at pp. 19--21, '193 P.2d 728.) There is
trial." Defendant testified that he knew no evidence that the wife withheld any inof the New Zealand holdings prior; to the formation relevant to the nature of her
divorce and that _pla~ntiff ,w~s rece;:iving New Zealand ~ncoJlle.,
$640 every four months' from New ZeaThe factual situation in -the present
land. In defendant1s divor~e questionnaire, case is analogous to that in Jorgensen v.
circulated _to determine the' extent of mari- Jorgensen, supra. In Jorgensen the hustp.l property holdings, expenses and in- band disclosed. alI known assets of the
come, he listed as plaintiff's separate prop- parties. The husband claimed certain aserty "50% stock interest in David Lloyd sets as his separate property. The wife
Co., Ltd.,-a New Zealand holding cor-, and her attorney _accepted the husband's
poration for many subsidiary companies statements at face value without. any in(cement, coal, paper)-exact worth un~ dependent investigation. Subsequent to
known to defendant-estimated to run in- the divorce decree, howeverJ they' learned
to millions of dollars." In a letter sent by that some of the assets the husband claimed
defendant's attorney to plaintiff's attorney as separate property were actually comin which the principal points of the prop- munity property, in which the wife was enerty settlement were summarized, defend- titled to a one-half interest. The wife was
ant proposed to transfer to plaintiff "any denied the right to set aside the property
interest he may .have in her holdings in settlement agreement. "If the wife and
New Zealand." Plaintiff also knew. of her attorney are satisfied with the husthe holdings but did not know of their band's classification of the property as
value or their tax consequences. In 1957 separate or community, the. wife cannot
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reasonably contend that fraud was com·
mitted or that there was such mistake as
to allow her to overcome the finality of a
judgment. * * * Plaintiff is barred
from obtaining equitable relief by her admission that she and her attorney did not
investigate the facts, choosing instead to
rely on the statements of the husband as
to' what part of the disclosed property was
community property." (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra, 32 Cal.2d 13 at pp. 22-23, 193
P.2d 728, at p. 734; see also, Cameron
v. Cameron, supra, 88 Cal.App.2d 585 at
pp. 595-597, 199 P.2d 443 wherein the holding of Jorgensen was found controlling.)
[13] In the present case both parties
knew of the New Zealand assets, but the
husband and his attorney chose not to investigate their taxabiHty. The property
settlement agreement expressly covered unknown tax liability. Having had full opportunity to consider all income of the wife
and its concurrent tax consequences, the
husband cannot now complain of the added
tax burden.
The order is reversed.

Los Angeles County, Mark Brandler, J.,
rendered judgment, and defendant's appeal was automatic. The Supreme Court,
Mosk, J., held that the giving of felonymurder instruction permitting jurors to find
defendant guilty of second-degree murder
if they found only that homicide was committed in perpetration of crime of assault
with deadly weapon was prejudicial error
in that it permitted conviction for seconddegree murder without a finding of essential element of malice aforethought. The
Court further held that the giving of
felony-murder instructions to effect that if
defendant entered his wife's apartment or
any room thereof with intent to commit an
assault with a deadly weapon he was guilty
of burglary, and if in course of such burglary he killed his wife and/or her male
guest, such killing was first-degree murder, whether it was .intentional, negligent,
or accidental was reversible error.
Judgment convicting defendant of
first- and second-degree murder reversed
and judgment affirmed insofar as it convicted him of assault with deadly weapon.
McComb, ]., dissented.

TOBRINER,
MOSK,
PETERS,
BURKE; and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur.
McCOMB, Justice.
I dissent. I would affirm the order of
the trial court.
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82 Ca1.Rptr. 494
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Re.pondent,

v.
R.f •• WILSON, Defendant and Appellant.
Cr. 12163.

Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Dec. 18. 1969.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 14, 1970.

The defendant was convicted of first:and second-degree murder and of assault
with deadly' weapon. The Superior Court,

I. Homicide 0$=>289,,340(1)

The giving of felony-murder instruction permitting jurors to find defendant
guilty of second-degree murder if they
found only that homicide was committed
in perpetration of crime of assault with
deadly weapon was prejudicial error in that
it permitted conviction for second-degree
murder without a finding of essential element of malice aforethought.
2. HomiCide e:>289, 340(1)

The giving of felony-murder instructions to effect that if defendant entered
his wife's apartment or any room thereof
with intent to commit an assault with a
deadly weapon he was guilty of burglary,
and if in course of such burglary he killed
his wife and/or her male guest, such killing
was first-degree murder, whether it was
intentional, negligent, or accidental was reversible error; overruling People v. Hamil-

